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Abstract—We investigate the impact of coalition formation on
the efficiency of Cournot games where producers face uncertain-
ties. In particular, we study a market model where firms must
determine their output before an uncertain production capacity
is realized. In contrast to standard Cournot models, we show that
the game is not efficient when there are many small firms. Instead,
producers tend to act conservatively to hedge against their risks.
We show that in the presence of uncertainty, the game becomes
efficient when firms are allowed to take advantage of diversity
to form groups of certain sizes. We characterize the tradeoff
between market power and uncertainty reduction as a function
of group size. In particular, we compare the welfare and output
obtained with coalitional competition, with the same benchmarks
when output is controlled by a single system operator. We show
when there are N firms present, competition between groups
of size Ω(
√
N) results in equilibria that are socially optimal in
terms of welfare and groups of size Ω(N2/3) are socially optimal
in terms of production. We also extend our results to the case
of uncertain demand by establishing an equivalency between
Cournot oligopoly and Cournot Oligopsony. We demonstrate our
results with real data from electricity markets with significant
wind power penetration.
Index Terms—Cournot Games, Decision Making under Uncer-
tainty, Efficiency, Coalitions, Electricity Markets
I. INTRODUCTION
Cournot games are among the most extensively studied
models for oligopolistic competition among multiple firms. A
Cournot oligopoly is a model where participants compete with
each other by controlling the amount of a homogeneous good
that they produce. A market price is determined as a function
of the total output of the firms. The profit of a firm is then the
product of the market price and their output quantity, less any
costs incurred. The producers are assumed to act strategically
and rationally to maximize their individual profits. This model
was initially studied by [1]; for surveys of such models, see,
e.g., [2], [3], [4].
In this paper, we consider Cournot competition among
firms who face production uncertainty. In the model we
consider, firms first commit to an expected level of output;
subsequently, actual production is realized, drawn from a dis-
tribution parameterized by the firm’s ex ante chosen level. Any
shortfall from the precommitted level incurs a penalty. Such a
model captures production decisions by firms in environments
where commitments must be made before all relevant factors
influencing production are known.
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Electricity markets serve as one motivating example of
such an environment. In electricity markets, producers submit
their bids before the targeted time of delivery (e.g., one day
ahead). However, renewable resources such as wind and solar
have significant uncertainty (even on a day-ahead timescale).
As a result, producers face uncertainties about their actual
production capacity at the commitment stage.
Our paper focuses on a fundamental tradeoff revealed in
such games. On one hand, in the classical Cournot model,
efficiency obtains as the number of individual firms approaches
infinity, as this weakens each firm’s market power (ability to
influence the market price through their production choice). On
the other hand, this result does not carryover when production
uncertainty is present: firms protect themselves against the
risk of being unable to meet the prior commitment by under-
producing relative to the efficient level.
In considering how to recover efficient performance, we
are naturally led to think of coalitions of firms. Informally,
if firms pool together, they can mitigate individual uncertainty
any one of them may perceive in future production (a law of
large numbers effect). Of course, coalitions are not without
their downside: coalitions possess greater market power than
individual firms. Indeed, this concern is substantial, as coali-
tions must be of fairly substantial size to mitigate the adverse
effects of production uncertainty. In the context of electricity
markets, regulators must grapple with the consequences of
allowing wind generators and other renewable resources to
form coalitions as they bid into the market. As a result we are
led to a fundamental question: how many coalitions should be
allowed to form, and of what size, if the regulator is interesting
in maximizing overall market efficiency?
We characterize this tradeoff by studying the efficiency
of Cournot competition when producers are allowed to form
coalitions. Our main contributions are as follows. First, in the
model described above, we characterize equilibrium among
competing coalitions, as well as the socially optimal bench-
mark. Second, as measures of efficiency, we compare both
the welfare and production output of the firms under Cournot
competition with the socially optimal welfare and output. We
characterize an optimal scaling regime for coalition structure
(in the limit of many firms) under which the efficiency losses
can be made arbitrarily small. That is, there exist coalitions
(partition of producers) that achieve essentially efficient reduc-
tion in uncertainty, but have no appreciable market power. We
also characterize the rate at which efficiency loss vanishes,
and establish these results when firms may have correlated
uncertainty. Finally, by establishing an equivalence between
Cournot oligopoly and Cournot oligopsony, we demonstrate
2our results are applicable to settings with demand uncertainty
as well; in particular, we illustrate the latter results in an
application to urban parking allocation.
Efficiency and welfare loss in Cournot games have been
studied extensively in various contexts. Early empirical analy-
sis of welfare loss was performed by [5] and [6]. Analytically,
at the limit where many firms compete, many authors showed
that a competitive limit exists [7], [8], [9], [10]. The quan-
tification of such a limit was considered by [11] where the
marginal costs of the firms are assumed to be constant. The
work of [12] showed that for N producers with the same cost
function competing for a resource with a differentiable demand
curve, the efficiency loss is no more than 1/(2N + 1) when
the producers are strategic and price anticipatory. The paper by
[13] derived a more general bound for convex demand curves
and [14] studies the how the loss can be estimated in practice.
The loss under asymmetric firms was studied by [15].
Most of the preceding literature concludes that full effi-
ciency is achieved when a large number of producers are
competing against each other. In this paper, we show that this
is not the case when production uncertainty plays a role in the
firms’ profits. Profit maximization under supply (or demand)
uncertainty falls under the well studied newsvendor problem in
the operations literature. However, most of previous work on
this area is concerned with a single retailer [16]. Oligopolistic
competition is studied in [17] for additive demand, and in
[18] for multiplicative demand; a related model with revenue
sharing between different firms is discussed in [19]. To our
knowledge, none of the previous works in this area consider
efficient coalition formation. Another related research is area
is contract designs (see, e.g. [20]), where designers impose
penalties to ensure that firms operate as expected. In this
paper, the penalty is from uncertainties that are intrinsic to
the problem.
One closely related work to our own is [21], where the au-
thor studies the role of intermediaries between diversification
and competition in a large economy. Their results are derived
under the assumption of a common randomness affecting all
consumers, whereas in our work each producer faces its own
randomness (possibly correlated with others). This latter effect
is what creates efficiency gains by allowing coalitions to form.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents our basic model of Cournot competition with two
stages: production commitments are made in the first stage,
and actual available production capacity is realized in the
second stage. The market price is determined in the first stage
based on production commitments. In the second stage, the
producer is charged a penalty if capacity is short of the firm’s
commitment level. We then study the same model assuming
firms act in coalitions. As the focus of the paper is on the
competition between groups, we do not study the nature of
revenue sharing contracts within a group; see, e.g., [22] and
[23].
In Section III, we begin by studying the case where firms
face i.i.d. production uncertainty. We first show that as the
number of firms N grows, the efficiency loss does not vanish
(due to the adverse effects of production uncertainty). We
also show that the other extreme, a grand coalition of all
producers, is inefficient (due to excessive exercise of market
power). We then study coalitional competition: in particular,
we characterize the optimal group size and the optimal rate at
which the efficiency loss approaches zero. By balancing the
adverse effects of market power with the benefits of reduction
in production uncertainty, we show that a coalition size of√
N producers (so
√
N coalitions compete in the market) is
optimal, and the efficiency loss is no more than O(1/
√
N). We
show that same results hold under two models of correlated
production uncertainty in Section IV.
Section V shows how the results can be applied to de-
mand uncertainty by deriving an equivalence between Cournot
oligopoly (firms competing to supply a good) and Cournot
oligopsony (firms competing to consume a good). Section VI
illustrates how the results can be applied in practice with a
case study of the electricity market in the Mid-Atlantic region
of the United States when wind power producers are included
in the market; this section is based on material in [24]. Section
VII concludes the paper.
II. TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we define a two-stage game where multiple
firms compete to satisfy the demand for a single resource. The
main difference between the two-stage model and classical
Cournot competition is that the bidding occurs in the first
stage, but each producer has an uncertain production capacity
at the time of delivery (second stage).
Suppose there are N firms. The market operates in two
stages as shown in Fig. 1. At the first stage, firm i chooses a
Firm Bids
First Stage
Penalty
Realized Capacity
Price
Second Stage
Fig. 1: The two-stage market model. Firms commit their
production in the first stage, and this determines the price
of the good. Capacities are realized in the second stage, and
penalties are assessed if a firm’s commitment is less than its
realized capacity.
committed production quantity xi as its bid into the market.
Let p(y) denote the market price when y units of aggregate
output is committed. Let Xi denote the capacity constraint
on firm i’s production. Note Xi is a random variable at the
first stage, and is realized in the second stage. Throughout the
paper, we will assume Xi’s are continuous, i.e., they follow a
distribution with a continuous probability density function. To
focus on the effect of production uncertainty, we assume that
each firm does not have a cost for producing the resource.1
If the promised amount (xi) is larger than the capacity (Xi)
firm i is penalized by a cost q per unit short fall. Thus the
1Our results would remain unchanged if each firm faced the same constant
marginal production cost.
3cost of shortfall for firm i is q(xi − Xi)+.2 Without loss of
generality, we set q = 1 for the remainder of the paper.
The assumption of a penalty linear in the shortfall is
relatively common in the literature on newsvendor problems.
This penalty allows us to capture the risk associated with
a shortfall, i.e., promising more than what can actually be
delivered; indeed, the penalty serves to make a firm risk averse
in its choice of commitment level. Our main results continue
to hold even for penalties of the form E[f(xi−Xi)+], as long
as f is convex, increasing, and has bounded derivative.
The structure of the penalty makes two important assump-
tions: first, that the penalty depends only on a firm’s own
shortfall (i.e., no inter-firm externalities); and that any excess
production capacity cannot be resold in a secondary market.
In practice, these assumptions may be violated. For example,
in electricity markets, a real-time market is run to balance the
realized supply and demand, and the study of such markets
remain an important future direction for us. Nevertheless, we
believe our model captures the first order effects of production
uncertainty on firm behavior, and on the role coalitions play
in achieving efficient outcomes.
We use the notation x−i to denote the quantities
of chosen by all firms except i; that is, x−i =
(x1, x2, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xN ). The expected profit for firm
i is
pii(xi,x−i) = p
(
N∑
l=1
xl
)
xi − E[(xi −Xi)+]. (1)
When each firm is price anticipatory, given x−i, firm i
chooses xi > 0 to maximize pii. A Nash equilibrium of the
game defined by (pi1, . . . , piN ) is a vector x ≥ 0 such that for
all i:
pii(xi,x−i) ≥ pii(x˜i,x−i), for all x˜i ≥ 0. (2)
To analyze the Nash equilibrium for this game, we make the
following assumptions on the price function p; this assumption
remains in force for the entire paper.
Assumption 1. We assume that:
1) p is strictly decreasing and p(0) > 0 ;
2) p(y) is concave and differentiable on y ≥ 0 with
p′(0+) < 0;
3) p(y)→ −∞ as y →∞.
Since p is decreasing, p(0) > 0, and tends to −∞, there is
a unique zero crossing point ymax such that:
p(ymax) = 0. (3)
These assumptions are common in the literature (e.g., see
[12]). The first assumption states that the price decreases as
quantity increases and p(0) > 0 avoids trivial solutions. Con-
cavity of the demand function is largely made for analytical
convenience and to avoid long derivations. (See Remark 1 at
the end of this section, which suggests that key results on
scaling of optimal coalition size continue to hold even with
weaker assumptions on demand, e.g., logconcavity.) The last
2For a real number z, let z+ denote the positive part of z, i.e., z+ = z
for z > 0, and 0 otherwise.
assumption is also made for analytical simplicity. In practice,
the price becomes zero for large enough y. This is analytically
undesirable since p may not be globally concave, so in the
third assumption we allow p to be negative. This assumption
is essentially without loss of generality since the regime of
interest is always restricted to aggregate production where p
is non-negative (see Proposition 1).
We make the following assumptions on the random variable
Xi throughout the paper:
Assumption 2. For all i, Xi is a continuous random variable
with finite mean.
This assumption is made mainly for analytic convenience.
It is now straight forward to show that a unique Nash
equilibrium exists for the game (pi1, . . . , piN ) as given in the
following result.
Proposition 1. Suppose p satisfies Assumption 1 and the Xi’s
satisfy Assumption 2. Then there exists a unique Nash equi-
librium x for the game defined by (pi1, . . . , piN ). Furthermore,∑
xi ≤ ymax.
The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix A.
Remark 1. The concavity assumption on the inverse-demand
function p can be relaxed to much weaker conditions. For
example, suppose that p is decreasing, continuous, and there
exist a ymax such that p(ymax) = 0. Note p is not necessarily
concave. If all of the firms experience uncertainties with the
same marginal distribution, the penalty function E[(x−Xi)+]
is identical for each firm i. By the result of [25] (or see
Theorem 1 in [26]), there exists a symmetric equilibrium for
the game defined by (pi1, . . . , piN ).
Of course without knowing more about p, it is hard to
characterize the equilibria of the game. In this paper, we
investigate the case of concave p, but as a consequence of the
preceding result, we expect that our main conclusions should
extend to more general types of inverse demand functions, at
least in the case when firms are identical.
A. The System Operator
We are interested in the efficiency of the Nash equilibrium
of the game (pi1, . . . , piN ). In this section, we outline the
benchmark welfare we consider; in particular, we focus on the
maximum welfare achieved by a centralized system operator.
To begin, given the price function p, we define aggregate
consumer surplus in the usual way as:
U(y) =
∫ y
0
p(z)dz. (4)
The system operator aims to maximize aggregate consumer
surplus, but incurs a cost a cost based on the expected
aggregated shortfall, assuming that it can control the output
of all the producers. Note that a key difference between this
work and the existing literature is how the cost is accounted
for: the system operator is effectively optimizing as if it is a
“grand coalition” of all firms, with utility defined by aggregate
consumer surplus. This model is inspired by the role of the
4independent system operator (ISO) in electricity markets; see,
e.g., [27].
maximize U
(
N∑
i
xi
)
− E


(
N∑
i=1
xi −
N∑
i=1
Xi
)+ (5a)
subject to xi ≥ 0, ∀ i. (5b)
The reason a system operator faces the aggregate shortfall,
E
[(∑N
i=1 xi −
∑N
i=1Xi
)+]
, instead of the sum of indi-
vidual shortfalls,
∑N
i=1 E
[
(xi −Xi)+
]
, is that it is always
beneficial to equalize possible shortfalls in quantity by sharing
resources. In the motivating example of electricity markets,
suppose a system operator had control of all wind farms. Then
as long as the sum of total realized wind,
∑
iXi, is larger than
the sum of the total committed wind,
∑
i xi, there would be
no additional cost.
The following lemma formalizes the benefit of aggregation
to a system operator.
Lemma 1. Suppose the Xi’s satisfy Assumption 2. Then
E


(
N∑
i=1
xi −
N∑
i=1
Xi
)+ ≤ N∑
i=1
E
[
(xi −Xi)+
]
. (6)
The proof of this lemma is a straightforward application of
Jensen’s inequality and is given in Appendix B.
Note that the objective function in (5) only depends on∑N
i=1 xi. With a change of variables, we can rewrite (5) as:
maximize U(y)− E

(y − N∑
i=1
Xi
)+ (7a)
subject to y ≥ 0. (7b)
By Assumption 1, U is differentiable and concave, so the
optimal solution to (7) is the unique positive solution to
p(y)− Pr
(
y ≥
N∑
i=1
Xi
)
= 0. (8)
Thus we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. A vector x is efficient (i.e., solves the optimiza-
tion problem (5)) if and only if:∑
i
xi = y
′
max, (9)
where y′max is the unique solution to (8). Further, y
′
max ≤
ymax.
Therefore at equilibrium, if the aggregate production of
firms is y′max, the equilibrium is socially optimal.
3
3It is straightforward to show, using the fact that p is decreasing, that in any
equilibrium firms produce less than y′max. We omit this standard argument.
B. Efficiency Ratio
In this section we define two closely related efficiency
ratios. The first is the usual notion based on the gap between
welfares of the Nash equilibrium and the system operator’s
optimal outcome. This is similar to the “price of anarchy” (e.g.,
[28]), but with the change that the benchmark is the system
operator’s payoff. The second efficiency ratio is defined as the
gap between the aggregate output at the Nash equilibrium and
y′max.
Definition 1. Consider the Cournot game (pi1, . . . , piN ). Let
(x1, . . . , xN ) be the Nash equilibrium of this game and let
y′max be the solution to (8). The efficiency ratio rW , with
respect to the welfare, is:
rW =
U
(∑N
i=1 xi
)
−∑Ni=1 E [(xi −Xi)+]
U(y′max)− E
[(
y′max −
∑N
i Xi
)+] . (10)
The efficiency ratio rO , with respect to the output, is:
rO =
∑N
i=1 xi
y′max
. (11)
Both efficiency ratios are of interest. The ratio of welfares
measures how (in)efficient the Nash equilibrium is, and the
ratio of quantities directly compares the total output under the
Nash equilibrium and the aggregate social output. For exam-
ple, in electricity markets, the independent system operator
(ISO) is typically interested in ensuing the maximum amount
of renewable power (e.g., wind) is injected into the market.
Therefore, rO , the ratio of the total output under the Nash
equilibrium and the maximum possible output y′max can be a
more direct measure of interest than rW , the ratio of welfares.
The rest of this paper investigates the behavior of rW and
rO as the number of firms and the number of coalitions grow.
In particular, we characterize the asymptotic scaling rate of
both efficiency ratios.
C. Deterministic Cournot Games
Before moving on to the main result in Sections III and
IV, we consider a deterministic version of the Cournot game,
i.e., one without production uncertainty. Understanding of this
deterministic game provides context for our results; further,
our proofs use the deterministic setting as a building block.
In the deterministic setting, we ignore the second stage of
the game. Therefore the payoff for firm i is:
pii(xi,x−i) = p
(
N∑
l=1
xl
)
xi. (12)
Compared with (1), note that the cost for shortfall is omitted.
For the rest of the paper, we use overlined variables to
represent quantities in the deterministic game.
Consider the game defined by (pi1, . . . , piN ). By the same
reasoning as in Proposition 1, a unique Nash equilibrium exists
for this game, denoted by (x1, . . . , xN ). The social welfare
5U(y) is maximized at ymax. The efficiency ratios for this game
are defined as:
rW =
U
(∑N
i xi
)
U(ymax)
(13)
and
rO =
∑N
i=1 xi
ymax
. (14)
The behavior of rW and rO as N increases is well
understood; see, e.g., [12]. As noted in Proposition 2, rW
approaches 1 and the game becomes efficient in the limit of
many firms. As we show in Section III, this is no longer true
if production uncertainty is present.
Proposition 2 (Corollary 18 in [12]).
lim
N→∞
rW → 1 and lim
N→∞
rO → 1.
D. Coalitions
In this section, we define Cournot competition among coali-
tions of firms. Given N firms, let S1, . . . ,SK be a partition of
{1, . . . , N}. Let (x1, . . . , xN ) be a vector of production levels
for each firm. The aggregate production commitment of group
Sk is denoted as x(Sk):
x(Sk) =
∑
i∈Sk
xi.
Similarly let X(Sk) =
∑
i∈Sk
Xi denote the aggregate (ran-
dom) realized capacity of the group SK . The payoff of the
group Sk is defined as:
pik(x(Sk)) = p
(∑
k
x(Sk)
)
x(Sk)− E[(x(Sk)−X(Sk))+].
(15)
Note that, as for the system operator, a coalition benefits by
being able to use the excess production of one member to
offset the shortfall of another. Thus the penalty incurred by
the coalition is the shortfall between their aggregate realized
capacity and aggregate production commitment. Note that we
do not consider the internal profit sharing contracts of each
coalition; instead, we focus on profit maximization of the
coalition.
Given S1, . . . ,Sk, we can define a Cournot game among
coalitions through the payoff functions (pi1, . . . , pik). In this
game the action for group Sk is the aggregate production
commitment x(Sk); as with profit, we do not focus on how
this commitment is divided among the individual firms. The
game played by coalitions is a “scaled” version of the original
game played by N individual firms. The key difference is that
the penalty is not linear in the firms. By an analogous result
to Lemma 1,
E[(x(Sk)−X(Sk))+] ≤
∑
i∈Sk
E[(xi −Xi)+]. (16)
It is this reduction in risk that makes coalitions useful, as we
describe in the subsequent sections.
III. INDEPENDENT FIRMS
In this section, we consider the efficiency of the two-stage
Cournot game when the production uncertainty is i.i.d. across
firms. Since we are interested in the large N regime, we need
to specify how the random variables (X1, . . . , XN ) scale as
N increases. Recall that Xi models the realized capacity of
production. Since we hold the price function constant as we
increase N , we should reasonably expect that each firm will
produce an infinitesimal amount in the limit. If we do not
adjust the production capacity accordingly, then each firm will
effectively face no production uncertainty in the large N limit.
Formally, we adjust the scale of the production capacity of
each firm according to the following assumption.
Assumption 3. Let X be a symmetric continuous random
variable with E[|X |3] < ∞. Let E[X ] = µ and we assume
µ > ymax; let Var(X) = σ
2. Suppose there are N firms. The
random variables X1, . . . , XN are drawn i.i.d. according to
the distribution of X/N .
Under the above assumption, the expected total capacity
is fixed at µ and is divided evenly among the N firms.
The technical assumption of a bounded third moment avoids
random variables with very heavy tails, and is largely made for
analytical convenience. The assumption µ > ymax streamlines
the proofs, but is not essential. We note that Assumption 3 can
be equivalently formulated by holding the production capacity
of each firm constant, but instead scaling the price functional
as N · p as the number of producers N increases.
Under Assumption 3, all firms are ex ante identical: they
have the same profit and face the same production uncertainty.
In this section we consider coalitional competition where the
firms are divided evenly intoK groups; since we are interested
in large N scenarios, we assume, without loss of generality,N
is a multiple of K . The two extreme values of K are K = 1
and K = N : the former corresponds to a grand coalition,
while the latter corresponds to competition among individual
firms.
The next theorem is the main result of this section, which
relates the efficiency ratios to the group size K .
Theorem 1. Suppose there are N firms and X1, . . . , XN
satisfies Assumption 3. Let (S1, . . . ,SK) be K groups where
each group has N/K firms. Let (x(S1), . . . , x(SK)) be the
solution to the game (pi1, . . . , piK). Then the efficiency ratios
scales as:
rW =
U
(∑K
k=1 x(Sk)
)
−∑Kk=1 E [(x(Sk)−X(Sk))+]
U(y′max)− E
[(
y′max −
∑N
i Xi
)+]
= 1−O
(
1
K2
)
−O
(
K
N
)
(17)
and
rO =
∑K
k=1 x(Sk)
y′max
= 1−O
(
1
K
)
−O
(
K
N
)
. (18)
We focus on the discussion of the results here; the full proof
of Theorem 1 is in Appendix C. The last two terms in (17)
6and (18) can be interpreted as the effects of market power and
production uncertainty, respectively. In (17), the inefficiency
due to market power scales as 1/K2, and it decreases as K
grows. On the other hand, the inefficiency due to production
uncertainty scales as K/N , which decreases as N/K (the
number of members in each coalition) grows. Similarly, in
(18), 1/K represents the inefficiency due to market power
and K/N represents the inefficiency due to uncertainty. Note
from (17) and (18) that rW and rO approach 1 as long as K
and N/K both grow without bound. The following corollary
gives the optimal coalition size for maximizing the rates at
which they approach 1.
Corollary 2. The optimal coalition structure to maximize the
right hand side of (17) is to divide N firms into Ω(N1/3)
groups, each of size Ω(N2/3).
The optimal coalition structure to maximize the right hand
side of (18) is to divide N firms into Ω(
√
N) groups, each of
size Ω(
√
N).
This Corollary follows directly from balancing the terms
in Theorem 1. It is interesting to note that rW and rO are
optimized by different coalition formations. However, both
rates suggest that it is more efficient to have intermediate
regimes of coalition sizes other than the two extremes of
individual firms and the grand coalition.
The result in Theorem 1 can be extended to a more general
shortfall penalty, as in the following corollary.
Corollary 3. Let f be a convex increasing function with
bounded derivative, satisfying f(x) = 0 for all x ≤ 0. For
a group S, let its total profit be given by:
piS(xS) = p
(
N∑
i=1
xi
)(∑
k∈S
xk
)
− E[f(xS −XS)]. (19)
Under the same conditions as Theorem 1, the efficiency ratios
still scale as
rW = 1−O
(
1
K2
)
−O
(
K
N
)
and
rO = 1−O
(
1
K
)
−O
(
K
N
)
.
The proof of this corollary is given in Appendix D.
Remark 2. The scaling rates in Theorem 1 and Corollary 3
are stated as lower bounds. There are instances that demon-
strate that these rates are tight. For example, let p(x) =
1 − x. In this case the inefficiency due to market power can
be calculated exactly and scales as rW = Ω(1/K
2) and
rO = Ω(1/K). Let Xi be a continuous random variable that
satisfies Chebyshev’s inequality with equality (see, e.g., [29]).
Then both rW and rO scale as Ω(K/N). (See the proof of
Theorem 1 for details.)
It is worthwhile to note that the scaling rates in Theorem
1 and Corollary 3 represent the asymptotic behavior of firms.
Constants of the terms in the scaling rate are determined by
the particular distributions of production uncertainty, and the
price function. We illustrate the behavior of the efficiency
ratio at finite N with the following example.
Example 1. Let p(y) = 1− y. Let X be normally distributed
as N (1.1, 1). Note that ymax = 1 < 1.1. Let Xi be drawn
i.i.d. according to the distribution of X/N . Figure 2 plots the
efficiency ratio for two groups sizes:
√
N and N2/3. Theorem
1 and Corollary 2 show that groups of size N2/3 is optimal
for welfare efficiency and groups of size
√
N is optimal for
rate efficiency. Figures 2a and 2b valid these claims, although
there is a switch over point in Fig. 2b.
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(a) Scaling of the welfare efficiency ratio.
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(b) Scaling of the quantity efficiency ratio.
Fig. 2: Scaling of the efficiency ratios for groups of size N2/3
and
√
N (for N1/3 and
√
N total groups, respectively). The
ratio of welfares, rW , approaches 1 faster when groups are
of size N2/3 than when groups are of size
√
N . The ratio of
quantities, rO, approaches 1 asymptotically faster when groups
are of size
√
N than when groups are of size N2/3.
IV. CORRELATED FIRMS
In this section, we consider two models where firms have
correlated production uncertainty.
A. Weakly Correlated Firms
The O(K/N) terms in (17) and (18) result from the law
of large numbers. The following corollary recovers the same
7result, using a version of the law of large numbers for
correlated random variables.
Corollary 4. Let X be a random variable satisfying As-
sumption 2. Let E[X ] = µ > ymax. Suppose there are
N firms. Assume the random variables X1, . . . , XN each
have marginal distribution that is the same as X/N . Let
(S1, . . . ,SK) be K groups where each group has N/K
firms. Let (x(S1), . . . , x(SK)) be the solution to the game
(pi1, . . . , piK).
If
N∑
j=1
|E [cor (Xi, Xj)]| ≤ c
N
∀ i (20)
for some c independent of N , then the efficiency ratios scale
as in (17) and (18).
An example of correlated Xi’s satisfying the above condi-
tion is where cov(Xi, Xj) ≤ Aρ|i−j|, for some finite A and
ρ < 1. This type of model captures a Hotelling-like geographic
structure, where firms with similar indices are more likely to
face the same production constraints. It is particularly relevant
in electricity markets, where wind turbines located near each
other exhibit this behavior. The proof of Corollary 4 is given
in Appendix E.
B. Strongly Correlated Firms
Earlier, we considered firms with weakly correlated pro-
duction capacity, in the sense that the correlations between
firms decays as the number of firms grows. In this section, we
consider the case of strongly correlated production capacities,
where the correlation between all firms remains positive as N
grows.
When the firms have correlated capacities, results similar to
Theorem 1 are difficult to obtain in general since the limiting
distribution of
∑
iXi does not necessarily concentrate; any
such result will depend on the particular joint distribution
of the Xi’s. For this section, we assume that the correlation
between random variables arises from an additive model, as
described in the following assumption.
Assumption 4. Let X be a zero mean continuous random
variable with symmetrical density and satisfies E[|X |3] <∞.
The random variables Xˆ1, . . . , XˆN are drawn i.i.d. according
to the same distribution as X/N . Let Z be a continuous
random variable with mean µ, finite variance, and symmet-
rical density around its mean. The random variables Z and
Xˆ1, . . . , XˆN are independent. The random variable Xi is
given by:
Xi = Xˆi +
Z
N
for all i. (21)
SinceXi’s are strongly correlated,
∑
iXi no longer concen-
trates around its mean. Therefore, even for a system operator
that jointly controls output of all firms, there is some residual
uncertainty in the system. However, it is still beneficial to
the system to share the production of all firms and then face
the cost of the aggregate shortfall. With the notations used in
Assumption 4, the system operators’s problem is
max
y≥0
U(y)− E[(y − Z −
N∑
i=1
Xˆi)
+]. (22)
As before, let y′max be the unique solution to (22) and y
′
max ≤
ymax.
Theorem 2 states that the efficiency ratios between the
welfares and the quantities have the same large N asymptotic
behavior as in Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Let Xˆ1, . . . , XˆN and Z be random variables
that satisfy Assumption 4. Let (S1, . . . ,SK) be a partition
of (1, . . . , N) with size N/K each. Let (x(S1), . . . , x(Sk))
be the solution to the two-stage game (pi1, . . . , piK). Suppose
µ > y′max. The efficiency ratios scale as:
rW =
U
(∑K
k=1 x(Sk)
)
−∑Kk=1 E [(x(Sk)−X(Sk))+]
U(y′max)− E
[(
y′max −
∑N
i Xi
)+]
= 1−O( 1
K2
)−O(K
N
) (23)
and
rO =
∑
k x(Sk)
y′max
= 1−O
(
1
K
)
−O
(
K
N
)
. (24)
The proof of Theorem 2 proceeds in similar steps to the
proof of Theorem 1 and can be found in the Appendix F.
C. Simulation Results
Here we plot the efficiency ratio for correlated firms and
compare it to independent firms. Similar to Example 1, let
p(y) = 1− y. Let Xˆ be normally distributed as N (1.1, 0.71)
and let Z be normally distributed as N (0, 0.71); note that with
this definition, the variance of Xˆ + Z is 1. Let Xˆi be drawn
i.i.d. according to the same distribution as Xˆ/N . Figure 3
shows the efficiency ratio rO for groups of size
√
N on a semi-
log plot. As a baseline, we also plot the efficiency ratio where
the random variables are drawn i.i.d. with normal distribution
N (1.1, 1).
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Fig. 3: Efficiency ratio for correlated firms and i.i.d. firms as
a function of the log of the number of firms. The groups size
are
√
N for both cases. We see that in the correlated case, the
efficiency ratio increases much faster than the i.i.d. case.
8From Figure 3, we can see that the efficiency ratio rO
approaches 1 much faster if the firms are correlated. This is not
unexpected, since production uncertainty is dominated by the
common random variable Z , and the individual randomness
can be averaged out more easily.
V. COURNOT OLIGOPSONY
There is a natural Cournot oligopsony game corresponding
to the Cournot oligopoly game discussed in previous sections.
Instead of suppliers of a common good, firms can be thought
as consumers of a common good. If there are uncertainties
in the demands of the firms, a natural question arises: does
coalition increase the efficiency of Cournot oligopsony as in
the case of Cournot oligopoly?
We answer this question by showing that under certain
demand side models, all results from previous sections can
be directly applied through an equivalency between Cournot
oligopoly and Cournot oligopsony. Before the technical details,
let us consider the following motivating example of parking
in business districts.
Example 2. Many cities around the world are experiencing
increasing vehicle traffic in downtown and business areas.
Currently, most cities allocate a fixed number of parking
spaces to a firm.4 For firm i, suppose it is allocated xi number
of parking spaces. The amount of vehicles (demand of the firm)
that visit the firm is a random variable denoted by Xi. If a
vehicle successfully finds parking, the firm derives a certain
amount of utility. If parking is not available when users try
to visit a firm, it gets no utility. Therefore firm i’s utility is
proportional to min(xi, Xi).
An increase of parking spaces is correlated with the total
traffic into downtown areas. This increase in traffic could po-
tentially increase congestion, and therefore parking is tightly
controlled by the city. We model this cost with a price function
pˆ(
∑
xi) and firm i has cost xipˆ(
∑
xi).
With the above motivation, we define the expected payoff
for firm i to be
Ti(xi,x−i) = E[min(xi, Xi)]− xipˆ
(
N∑
l=1
xl
)
. (25)
Each firm is price anticipatory and firm i chooses xi > 0 to
maximize Ti for a given x−i. A Nash equilibrium for this
game is defined to be the same as in (2). As the analogous
of Assumption 1, we make the following assumption on the
price pˆ.
Assumption 5. We assume that:
1) pˆ is strictly increasing and 0 < pˆ(0) < 1;
2) pˆ(y) is convex and differentiable on y ≥ 0 with pˆ′(0+) >
0;
3) pˆ(y)→∞ as y →∞.
The pˆ(0) < 1 assumption is made to avoid trivial solutions,
since if pˆ(0) > 1 no firm will choose a positive bid. Note we
assume that the utility and the price function, E[min(xi, Xi)]
and pˆ, have been appropriately scaled to have the same units.
4Excluding private parking garages
It is straight forward to show that a Nash equilibrium exists
for the game (T1, . . . , TN ) as given in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Suppose pˆ satisfies Assumption 5 and the
Xi’s satisfy Assumption 2. Then there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium x for the game defined by (T1, . . . , TN).
The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix G.
A. Social Welfare and Efficiency
Given the price function pˆ, we define the aggregate cost as:
C(y) =
∫ y
0
pˆ(z)dz. (26)
Similar to the oligopoly case, a system operator with control
of all the firms would always aggregate the supply and demand
as shown by Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. Suppose x1, . . . , xN are a set of real numbers and
X1, . . . , XN are a set real random variables each satisfying
Assumption 2. Then
E
[
min
(
N∑
i=1
xi,
N∑
i=1
Xi
)]
≥
N∑
i=1
E [min(xi, Xi)] . (27)
The proof of this lemma is given in Appendix 2.
Therefore, from a system operator’s point of view, the
optimal allocation is characterized by solving the following
problem:
maximize E
[
min
(
N∑
i=1
xi,
N∑
i=1
Xi
)]
− C
(
N∑
i=1
xi
)
(28a)
subject to xi ≥ 0, ∀ i. (28b)
The objective function in (28) only depends on the sum of
allocations, so we can write it as
maximize E
[
min
(
y,
N∑
i=1
Xi
)]
− C (y) (29a)
subject to y ≥ 0. (29b)
Let yˆmax be the solution to (29). As in Definition 1, we
define the two efficiency ratios, one based on the welfares and
one based on the quantities.
Definition 2. Consider the Cournot game (T1, . . . , TN). Let
(x1, . . . , xN ) be the Nash equilibrium of this game. The
efficiency ratio rW , with respect to the welfares, is:
rW =
∑N
i=1 E [min (xi, Xi)]− C
(∑N
i=1 xi
)
E
[
min
(
yˆmax,
∑N
i=1Xi
)]
− C (yˆmax)
. (30)
The efficiency ratio rO , with respect to the quantities, is:
rO =
∑N
i=1 xi
yˆmax
. (31)
As in Sections III and IV, we are interested in the behaviors
of rW and rO as N grows. The next section shows that there is
an exact equivalence between the game (T1, . . . , TN ) studied
in this section and the game (pi1, . . . , piN ) studied in Sections
III and IV. Consequently the main results in Theorems 1 and
2 carry over directly.
9B. Equivalence between Oligopoly and Oligopsony
A certain level of symmetry between oligopoly and oligop-
sony is commonly expected in Cournot games, but the key
difficulty is to ensure that efficient allocations and Nash
equilibria remain unchanged between the two models. The
following theorem is the main result of this section.
Theorem 3. Suppose that Assumptions 2 and 5 hold. Define
a new price p as:
p(y) = 1− pˆ(y). (32)
Define an associated utility function U(y) =
∫ y
0
p(z)dz. Then
1) Assumption 1 is satisfied by p.
2) For any vector x ≥ 0, the following holds:
E
[
min
(∑
i
xi,
∑
i
Xi
)]
− C
(∑
i
xi
)
= U
(∑
i
xi
)
− E

(∑
i
xi −
∑
i
Xi
)+ , (33)
as well as:
Ti(xi;x−i) = E[min(xi, Xi)]− xipˆ
(∑
l
xl
)
= xip
(∑
l
xl
)
− E[(xi −Xi)+]
= pi(xi;x−i). (34)
3) A vector x solves the system operator’s problem in (5)
if and only if it solves the system operator’s problem in
(28).
4) A vector x is a Nash equilibrium of the game defined
by (T1, . . . , TN ) if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium
of the game defined by (pi1, . . . , piN ).
In Appendix I we provide proofs of the four claims above.
VI. CASE STUDY OF WIND INTEGRATION IN POWER
SYSTEMS
This section applies the result of this paper to electricity
markets. This material is based on [24]. We focus on the PJM
control area in the United States (an area that covers most
of the Mid-Atlantic states of the United States). In recent
years, there has been a dramatic increase of wind generation
in PJM. Among other effects, the one most pertinent to this
paper is a significant drop in energy prices as wind penetration
grows. Figure 4 (reproduced from [30]) shows the day-ahead
electricity price can drop by as much as 50% with just 10%
of wind penetration.
The electricity market in PJM and most other regions of
the United States operate with a two-stage structure. The
first stage occurs roughly 24 hours before the actual time
of delivery of electricity–called the day-ahead stage–where
generators compete to satisfy the forecasted demand. The
second stage is called the real-time stage since it adjusts supply
and demand to meet any imbalance that may occur at the
time of electricity delivery. Since most conventional generators
Fig. 4: Scatter plot of PJM day-ahead prices and wind gener-
ation for 2012. Figure reproduced from [30]. The horizontal
axis is the percentage penetration of wind, and the vertical axis
is the average clearing price in the PJM area. As the amount
of wind penetration increases from 0 to 10%, the average price
in the system drops by more than half.
(e.g., coal, nuclear, hydro, etc.) needs at least several hours
to change production levels, most of the market is cleared
at the day-ahead stage. In this paper, we are interested in
the wind power producers and treat conventional generators
as non-strategic entities. From PJM market reports ([31]), it
seems that conventional generators already bid their true cost
in the current market, and therefore would not change their bid
when wind power producers enter the market (bidding lower
makes no economic sense and bidding higher decreases the
chance that they are cleared). However, investigating the joint
action between renewable and conventional generators is an
important area of future research.
We think of wind power producers as the firms competing
in the day-ahead market. Each firm faces uncertain supply,
since its output is determined by the wind conditions in the
future; in addition, each firm can impact the price as shown
in Fig. 4. Therefore the Cournot game developed in this paper
can be used to model their behavior.
For an empirical study, we use wind data produced by
National Renewable Energy Lab (NREL) for Eastern United
States [32]. Both wind forecast value and forecast error are
included in the data set. We interpret the forecast value as the
mean of the random supply and the error as the variation in the
supply. There are 302 wind farm locations that are in the PJM
control area. Figure 5 shows the normalized standard deviation
of the aggregate forecast as a function of the number of wind
farms in the aggregate. Strong correlations can be observed
between these forecasts.
Applying the analysis in Section IV, Fig. 6 shows the
optimal coalitions of the wind farms. Note the social optimal
solution is taken to be the solution that maximizes the amount
of wind injected into the market. Interested readers can find a
much more detailed analysis in [24].
10
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Number of Producers
St
an
da
rd
 D
ev
ia
tio
n 
(p.
u.)
Fig. 5: Standard deviation as a function of the number of
producers in an aggregation. The vertical axis is normalized
by the total capacity of the aggregation.
Fig. 6: Total amount of wind bid into the day-ahead market
as a function of the number of groups for the wind farms in
the NREL dataset. The maximum occurs at 30 groups, while
the minimum occurs at a single group (grand coalition).
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we investigated strategic behavior of firms and
coalitions in a Cournot game with production uncertainty. We
study the efficiency of Cournot competition by characterizing a
fundamental tradeoff: on one hand, market power increases as
coalition size grows; on the other hand, the cost of production
uncertainty is mitigated as coalition size grows. We show there
is a “sweet spot”, in the sense that there exist groups that are
large enough to achieve the uncertainty reduction of the grand
coalition, but small enough such that they have no significant
market power.
These results have important implications for regulators in
industries with production uncertainty, such as electricity mar-
kets. In particular, our results suggest that within some limits,
coalition formation among, e.g., generators of renewables may
actually increase overall welfare. We have validated these
results in electricity markets in [24], where we empirically
study the welfare benefits of coalitions of (a finite number of)
wind power generators.
We conclude by noting two important open directions.
First, as previously noted, in many real markets (including
electricity markets), the penalty for a production shortfall is
not exogenous. Rather, a firm may face a “spot” or secondary
market, into which it can sell excess capacity, or from which
it must buy additional capacity to cover a shortfall. Modeling
this two-stage market game remains an important challenge.
Second, all our results are asymptotic, though we do char-
acterize the rate of convergence to efficiency with optimal
coalition sizes. With finitely many (potentially heterogeneous)
firms, the regulator faces the potentially challenging problem
of computing optimal coalitions as a benchmark. Developing
approaches for this problem remains an open issue.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof. We first observe that the strategy space of each firm can
be restricted to a compact set, without loss of generality. For
any vector x−i chosen by the other firms, if Pr(Xi < ymax) >
0, then firm i is always strictly better off by choosing 0 than
choosing a quantity larger than ymax. If Pr(Xi < ymax) = 0
and
∑
k 6=i xk > 0, again firm i is always strictly better off
by choosing 0 than choosing a production larger than ymax.
If Pr(Xi < ymax) = 0 and
∑
k 6=i xk = 0, then firm i’s best
strategy is to maximize xip(xi). By Assumption 1, the unique
maximizer of xip(xi) is strictly larger than 0 and strictly
smaller than ymax. Thus, we may restrict the strategy space
of a firm to [0, ymax].
Since p satisfies Assumption 1, p(
∑
i xi)xi is concave. By
Assumption 2, E[(xi − Xi)+] exists and −E[(xi − Xi)+]
is concave in xi. By additivity of concave functions, pii is
concave for all xi ≥ 0.
The game defined by (pi1, . . . , piN ) with strategy spaces
([0, ymax], . . . , [0, ymax]) is now a strictly concave game: each
payoff pii is continuous and strictly concave in x and the
strategy space of firm i is a nonempty compact set. By
Rosen’s existence theorem (see [33]), there is a unique Nash
equilibrium for this game.
Furthermore, suppose
∑
xi > ymax. Then at least one of
the xi’s is positive. But then firm i is strictly better off if it
reduces xi. Therefore at equilibrium,
∑
xi ≤ ymax.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof. This lemma follows from Jensen’s inequality. Let
W1, . . . ,WN be N random variables. Let g(·) = (·)+. Since
g is convex, we have
E[g(
N∑
i
1
N
Wi)] ≤ 1
N
N∑
i
E[g(Wi)]. (35)
Since g is homogenous, multiplying both side of (35) by N
gives
E[g(
N∑
i
Wi)] ≤
N∑
i
E[g(Wi)].
Identify Wi with xi −Xi finishes the proof.
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof. We fill first assume (18) holds and use it to prove (17).
Then we prove (18) to be true.
First we observe that all groups are symmetric, therefore
each of them has the same expected cost:
K∑
k=1
E
[
(x(Sk)−X(Sk))+
]
= KE
[
(x(Sk)−X(Sk))+
]
= E
[
(Kx(Sk)−KX(Sk))+
]
.
For notational convenience, let xK = Kx(Sk) and XK =
KX(Sk). Note that E[XK ] = µ. Let XˆK=XK − µ be the
zero mean version. Similarly, we can write
∑N
i Xi = µ+ Xˆ ,
where Xˆ is zero mean. Using these notations, the efficiency
ratio rW is
rW =
U(xK)− E
[(
xK − µ− XˆK
)+]
U(y′max)− E
[(
y′max − µ− Xˆ
)+] . (36)
The following proposition is useful for bounding rW .
Proposition 4. Let V and W be independent continuous ran-
dom variables with symmetric densities. Furthermore suppose
E[V ] = E[W ] = 0. Let a be a positive real number. Then
E
[
(V +W − a)+
]
≥ E
[
(W − a)+
]
. (37)
The proof of Prop. 4 is given later. Applying it, we have
E
[(
xK − µ− XˆK
)+]
≤ E
[(
xK − µ− Xˆ − XˆK
)+]
,
(38)
where X is independent of XˆK and the expectation is now
taken with respect to both Xˆ and XˆK . Therefore to lower
bound rW , it suffices to lower bound
∆U =U(y
′
max)− E
[(
y′max − µ− Xˆ
)+]
− U(xK)
− E
[(
xK − µ− Xˆ − XˆK
)+]
. (39)
Inserting an independent copy of Xˆ into the expectation
allows us to analyze (39) using a Taylor expansion. Let δ =
y′max − xK ,
U(xK) = U(y
′
max − δ)
≈ U(y′max)− δU ′(y′max) +
δ2
2
U ′′(y′max), (40)
where we neglect the higher order terms in the Taylor ex-
pansion. Let g(y) = E
[(
y − µ− Xˆ
)+]
. To obtain a Taylor
expansion of E
[(
xK − µ− Xˆ − XˆK
)+]
around y′max, we
use conditional expectation by successively conditioning on
XˆK and Xˆ:
E
[(
xK − µ− Xˆ − XˆK
)+]
= EXˆ
[
EXˆK
[
g(y′max − δ − XˆK)|Xˆ
]]
≈ EXˆ
[
EXˆK
[
g(y′max)− (δ + XˆK)g′(y′max) +
(δ + XˆK)
2
2
g′′(y′max)
]]
(a)
= g(y′max)− δg′(y′max) +
δ2
2
g′′(y′max) +
E[Xˆ2K ]
2
g′′(y′max),
(41)
where again the higher order terms are neglected and (a)
follows from E[XˆK ] = 0 and the independence between Xˆ
and XˆK .
Substituting (40) and (41) into (39) yields:
∆U ≈ U(y′max)− g(y′max)−
{
U(y′max)− δU ′(y′max) +
δ2
2
U ′′(y′max)
}
+
{
g(y′max)− δg′(y′max) +
δ2
2
g′′(y′max) +
E[Xˆ2K ]
2
g′′(y′max)
}
= δ (U ′(y′max)− g′(y′max)) +
δ2
2
(g′′(y′max)− U ′′(y′max))
+
E[Xˆ2K ]
2
g′′(y′max)
(a)
=
δ2
2
(g′′(y′max)− U ′′(y′max)) +
E[Xˆ2K ]
2
g′′(y′max),
(42)
where (a) follows from first order optimality conditions and
fact that y′max maximizes U(y)− g(y). We now derive more
explicit formulas for the constants in (42):
g′′(y′max) =
d2
dy2
E[(y − µ− Xˆ)+]|y′
max
=
d
dy
E[1(y − µ− Xˆ)+]
=
d
dy
Pr(Xˆ ≤ y − µ)
= fˆ(y − µ),
where fˆ is the pdf of Xˆ ; and U ′′(y′max) = p
′(ymax).
By Assumption 2, fˆ exists; by Assumption 1, p′(y′max)
is negative. Therefore both g′′(y′max) and −U ′′(y′max) are
positive constants.
The deviation δ2 can be calculated from (18). By (18), δ
scales as O( 1K ) +O(
K
N ) and δ
2 scales as
O
(
1
K2
)
+O
(
1
N
)
+O
(
K2
N2
)
.
Since XˆK is zero mean,
E[Xˆ2K ] = Var(XK) = Var

K N/K∑
i=1
Xi


= K2
1
NK
σ2 =
K
N
σ2 = O
(
K
N
)
.
12
Combining the above arguments, we have
U(y′max)− g(y′max)− (U(xK)− E[(y − µ− Xˆ − XˆK)+])
= O
(
1
K2
)
+O
(
1
N
)
+O
(
K2
N2
)
+O
(
K
N
)
= O
(
1
K2
)
+O
(
K
N
)
.
By Prop. 4, E[(y−µ− Xˆ− XˆK)+] ≥ E[(y−µ− XˆK)+] and
we have the efficiency ratio scales as
rW = 1−O
(
1
K2
)
−O
(
K
N
)
. (43)
We now prove (18). The strategy of the proof proceeds in
two steps. First we consider a deterministic game withK play-
ers, and bound the difference between the Nash equilibrium
of the game (pi1, . . . , piK) and the Nash equilibrium of the
deterministic game. Then we bound the difference between
the latter and ymax.
Let (S1, . . . ,SK) be an equal sized partition of (1, . . . , N),
with each coalition of size N/K . Consider a deterministic
game defined by (pi1, . . . , piK) where
pik = p
(
K∑
m=1
x(Sm)
)
x(Sk). (44)
Let (x(S1), . . . , x(SK)) be a Nash equilibrium of this game.
By symmetry, x(Sk) are of the same value. We denote this
value by xK ; it satisfies:
p(KxK) + p
′(KxK)xK = 0. (45)
Let (x(S1), . . . , x(SK)) be a Nash equilibrium of the
game (pi1, . . . , piK). Again, this equilibrium is symmetric.
Denote the common production level of each coalition by
xK . Similarly, denote X(Sk) by XK . Since E[(xK −XK)+]
is increasing in xK , we have xK ≤ xK . Therefore we can
rewrite xK as xK −∆, for some ∆ ≥ 0 that solves:
p(K(xK −∆)) + p′(K(xK −∆))(xK −∆)
− Pr(XK ≤ xK −∆) = 0. (46)
Subtracting (45) from (46), we have
[p(KxK −K∆)− p(KxK)] + [p′(KxK −K∆)(xK −∆)
− p′(KxK)xK ]− Pr(XK ≤ xK −∆) = 0.
Since p is concave and decreasing, p′(KxK) < p
′(KxK −
K∆) < 0. Also since xK is positive, the term in the second set
of brackets, p′(KxK−K∆)(xK−∆)−p′(KxK)xK is greater
than or equal to zero. Also since ∆ is positive, Pr(XK ≤
xK −∆) ≤ Pr(Xk ≤ xK). Therefore:
p(KxK −K∆)− p(KxK)− Pr(XK ≤ xK) ≤ 0. (47)
Since p is concave and decreasing,
p(KxK −K∆)− p(KxK) ≥ K∆(−p′(0)). (48)
Combining (47) and (48), we obtain a bound on K∆, or∑
k x(Sk)−
∑
k x(Sk), as
K∆ ≤ Pr(XK ≤ xK)−p′(0) ≤
Pr(XK ≤ ymax/K)
−p′(0) . (49)
By assumption, µ > ymax; applying Chebyshev’s inequality
gives Pr(XK ≤ ymax/K) = O(K/N). Therefore K∆ =
O(K/N).
Now we bound the gap between KxK and ymax. Let δ =
ymax −KxK . Substituting into (45) gives:
p(ymax − δ) + p′(ymax − δ)
(
ymax − δ
K
)
= 0. (50)
Since p is decreasing and δ is positive,
p(ymax − δ) + p′(ymax − δ)
(ymax
K
)
≤ 0. (51)
Rearranging yields
p(ymax − δ) ≤ −p′(ymax − δ)
(ymax
K
)
(∗)
≤ −p′(ymax)
(ymax
K
)
, (52)
where (∗) follows from the fact p′ is negative and decreas-
ing (p is decreasing and concave). Since p is concave and
decreasing, and p(ymax) = 0,
p(ymax − δ) ≥ δ p(0)
ymax
. (53)
See Figure 7 for an illustration of (53). Combining (52) and
(53) gives
δ
p(0)
ymax
≤ −p′(ymax)ymax
K
, (54)
or
δ ≤ 1
K
−p′(ymax)y2max
p(0)
. (55)
Therefore δ = O(1/K).
PSfrag replacements
p(0)
p(ymax − δ)
δp(0)
ymax
ymax − δ
ymax
Fig. 7: Graphical demonstration of (52).
Combining the two parts of the proof,
ymax −
∑
k
x(Sk) = O
(
1
K
)
+O
(
K
N
)
. (56)
Dividing both sides by ymax gives the desired result:
rO = 1−O
(
1
K
)
−O
(
K
N
)
. (57)
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Finally we prove Prop. 4. Let fV and fW be the pdf of V
and W , respectively. Then
E
[
(V +W − a)+]− E [(W − a)+]
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ µ
µ−v
(u+ v − µ)fW (w)fV (v)dwdv
+
∫ 0
−∞
∫ µ+x
µ
(µ− w)fW (w)fV (v)dwdv
+
∫ ∞
µ
∫ w−µ
µ−w
vfV (v)fW (w)dvdw
+
∫ infty
0
∫ µ+x
µ
wfW (w)fV (v)dwdv.
By symmetry of fV ,∫ ∞
µ
∫ w−µ
µ−w
vfV (v)fW (w)dvdw = 0.
By symmetry of fW ,∫ 0
−∞
∫ µ+x
µ
−wfW (w)fV (v)dwdv
+
∫ infty
0
∫ µ+x
µ
wfW (w)fV (v)dwdv = 0.
Therefore
E
[
(V +W − a)+]− E [(W − a)+]
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ µ
µ−v
(u+ v − µ)fW (w)fV (v)dwdv
+
∫ 0
−∞
∫ µ+x
µ
µfW (w)fV (v)dwdv
≥ 0.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF COROLLARY 3
Proof. Let (S1, . . . ,SK) be a equal sized partition of
(1, . . . , N) (each of size N/K). Consider the deter-
ministic game (pi1, . . . , piK) played by the groups. Let
(x(S1), . . . , x(SK)) be a Nash equilibrium of this game.
Let (x(S1), . . . , x(SK)) be a Nash equilibrium of the game
(pi1, . . . , piK). Since E[f(xK −XK)] is increasing in x(Sk),
xK ≤ xK , we can rewrite xK as xK − ∆ with ∆ ≥ 0.
Following the proof of Theorem 1, we obtain (in place of
(49)):
K∆ ≤ E[f
′(xK −XK)]
−p′(0) . (58)
Since f ′ is bounded, E[f ′(xK−Xk)] ≤ B Pr(xK −XK ≥ 0)
for some B. Therefore ∆ scales as O(K/N). Following the
same steps as in the proof of Theorem 1, the efficiency ratio
rO scales as 1− O
(
1
K
)−O (KN ). An analogous proposition
to Prop. 4 can be derived for a convex and increasing f , and a
similar Taylor expansion argument can be used to bound rW
based on rO .
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF COROLLARY 4
Proof. Consider a group Sk. It suffices to show that
Pr(
∑
i∈Sk
Xi ≤ ymax/K) is O(K/N) since the rest of the
proof proceeds exactly as that of Theorem 1.
Equation (20) implies that
Pr
(∑
i∈Sk
Xi ≤ ymax/K
)
≤ c
(µ− ymax)2
K
N
= O
(
K
N
)
.
(59)
(See, e.g., [34], for this standard result.)
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof. This proof follows a similar path to that of Theorem
1. We assume (24) to be true and prove (23) holds. Then we
prove (24).
By symmetry, x(Sk) are equal for all k and we denote∑K
k=1 x(SK) as xK and xK = Kx(S1). Let XK denote
KX(Sk). By Assumption 4, the random variable XK can be
related to Z as
XK = Z + XˆK
where XˆK has the same distribution as
XˆK = K
N/K∑
i=1
Xˆi.
Therefore
U
(
K∑
k=1
x(Sk)
)
−
K∑
k=1
E
[
(x(Sk)−X(Sk))+
]
= U (xK)− E
[(
xK − Z − XˆK
)+]
.
Let Xˆ =
∑N
i=1 Xˆi. Then
rW =
U (xK)− E
[(
xK − Z − XˆK
)+]
U (y′max)− E
[(
y′max − Z − Xˆ
)+] .
Applying Prop. 4, E
[(
xK − Z − XˆK
)+]
≤
E
[(
xK − Z − Xˆ − XˆK
)+]
where Xˆ is independent
of XˆK . By exactly the same argument as in the proof of
Theorem 1, by assuming (24), we can show
rW = 1−O
(
1
K2
)
−O
(
K
N
)
.
We prove (24) holds by first defining the following inter-
mediate game. Define the payoff function:
pik = p
(∑
k
x(Sk)
)
x(Sk)−E[(x(Sk)− 1
K
(Z−µ))+]. (60)
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Let (x(S1), . . . , x(SK)) be a Nash equilibrium of the game
defined by (pi1, . . . , piK) (given in (60)). By symmetry, x(Sk)
are the same for all k. We denote this value by xK ; it satisfies:
p(KxK) + p
′(KxK)xK − Pr(xK ≥ 1
K
(Z + µ)) = 0. (61)
Let (x(S1), . . . , x(SK)) be a Nash equilibrium of the game
(pi1, . . . , piK). Again by symmetry, all coalitions choose the
same production level. Denote this value by xK . Similarly,
denote X(Sk) as XK . Since E[(xK −XK)+] is increasing in
x(Sk), xK ≤ xK . Therefore we can rewrite xK as xK −∆,
for some ∆ ≥ 0 that solves:
p(K(xK −∆)) + p′(K(xK −∆))(xK −∆)
− Pr(xK −∆ ≥ XK) = 0. (62)
By definition of XK , (62) can be written as:
p(K(xK −∆)) + p′(K(xK −∆))(xK −∆)
− Pr

xK −∆ ≥ 1
K
Z +
N/K∑
i=1
Xˆi

 = 0. (63)
Subtracting (61) from (63) and following the steps of the proof
in Theorem 1, we have
K∆(−p′(0)) ≤ Pr

xK −∆ ≥ 1
K
Z +
N/K∑
i=1
Xˆi


− Pr
(
xK ≥ 1
K
(Z + µ)
)
= Pr

KxK −K∆ ≥ Z +K N/K∑
i=1
Xˆi


− Pr(KxK ≥ Z + µ).
Since ∆ ≥ 0,
K∆(−p′(0)) ≤ Pr

KxK ≥ Z +K N/K∑
i=1
Xˆi


− Pr(KxK ≥ Z + µ).
It is convenient to associate the mean µ with Z rather than
Xˆi. Define Z
′ = Z + µ and Xˆ ′K = K
∑N/K
i=1 Xˆi. With this
change of variables, we need to bound
Pr(KxK ≥ Z ′ + Xˆ ′K)− Pr(KxK ≥ Z ′).
By conditional probability and the independence of Z ′ and
Xˆ ′K ,
Pr(KxK ≥ Z ′ + Xˆ ′K)− Pr(KxK ≥ Z ′)
=Pr(KxK ≥ Z ′ + Xˆ ′K |Xˆ ′K ≤ 0)Pr(Xˆ ′K ≤ 0)
+ Pr(KxK ≥ Z ′ + Xˆ ′K |Xˆ ′K > 0)Pr(Xˆ ′K > 0)
− Pr(KxK ≥ Z ′)
={Pr(KxK ≥ Z ′)
+ Pr(KxK < Z
′,KxK ≥ Z ′ + Xˆ ′K |Xˆ ′K ≤ 0)}Pr(Xˆ ′K ≤ 0)
+ Pr(KxK ≥ Z ′ + Xˆ ′K |Xˆ ′K > 0)Pr(Xˆ ′K > 0)
− Pr(KxK ≥ Z ′)
≤{Pr(KxK ≥ Z ′)
+ Pr(KxK < Z
′,KxK ≥ Z ′ + Xˆ ′K |Xˆ ′K ≤ 0)}Pr(Xˆ ′K ≤ 0)
+ Pr(KxK ≥ Z ′) Pr(Xˆ ′K > 0)− Pr(KxK ≥ Z ′)
=Pr(KxK < Z
′,KxK ≥ Z ′ + Xˆ ′K |Xˆ ′K ≤ 0)Pr(Xˆ ′K ≤ 0)
≤Pr(KxK < Z ′,KxK ≥ Z ′ + Xˆ ′K |Xˆ ′K ≤ 0)Pr(Xˆ ′K ≤ 0)
+ Pr(KxK < Z
′,KxK ≥ Z ′
+ Xˆ ′K |Xˆ ′K > 0)Pr(Xˆ ′K > 0)
=Pr(KxK < Z
′,KxK ≥ Z ′ + Xˆ ′K).
By assumption Z ′ is a continuous random variable with a
bounded density function, and we denote its density by fZ′ .
Let fZ,max denote the maximum value of fZ′ . Also, denote
the density of Xˆ ′K by fX′ . Then
Pr(KxK < Z
′,KxK ≥ Z ′ + Xˆ ′K)
=
∫ 0
−∞
∫ KxK−x
KxK
fZ′(z)fX′(x)dzdx
(a)
≤ fZ,max
∫ 0
−∞
(−x)fX′dx
(b)
= fZ,max
∫ ∞
0
xfX′dx
(c)
≤ fZ,max · const · var(Xˆ ′),
where (a) follows from boundedness of fZ , (b) follows from
the symmetry in Xˆ ′ and (c) follows from the fact that Xˆ ′K
has bounded variance. Therefore
∑
xK −
∑
xK = O(
K
N ).
Now we bound the difference between
∑
xK and y
′
max. By
definition y′max solves
p(y′max)− Pr(y′max − Z − µ > 0) = 0. (64)
Write KxK as y
′
max− δ for some δ > 0, and subtracting (64)
from (61) gives
{p(y′max − δ)− p(y′max)} + p′(y′max − δ)
y′max − δ
K
− {Pr(y′max − δ − Z − µ > 0)− Pr(y′max − Z − µ > 0)} = 0.
Since p is decreasing and concave, and δ > 0, we have
p′(y′max − δ)(−δ) > 0 p′(y′max) ≤ p′(y′max − δ) ≤ 0, and
{Pr(y′max − δ − Z − µ > 0)− Pr(y′max − Z − µ > 0)} < 0.
Therefore
p(y′max − δ)− p(y′max) ≤ −p′(y′max)
y′max
K
.
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Since p is concave and decreasing, p(y′max − δ)− p(y′max) ≥
δ
p(0)−p(y′
max
)
y′
max
(see Figure 7). Thus:
δ ≤ −p′(y′max)
y′2max
K(p(0)− p(y′max))
.
Combining with the first half of the proof gives the desired
result.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Proof. By Assumption 2, E[min(xi, Xi)] exists and is con-
cave (expectation over point-wise minimums). By Assumption
5, xipˆ(
∑
xi) is convex. Thus Ti is concave for all xi > 0.
Since E[min(xi, Xi)] increasing at most linearly with xi
and pˆ(
∑
xi) is convex and increasing without bound, there
exists constants Bi such that E[min(Bi, Xi)]−Bipˆ(Bi) < 0.
For firm i, there is no incentive to choose xi greater than
Bi since it would be strictly better off choosing xi = 0.
Therefore we may restrict the strategy space of firm i to
[0, Bi]. The game defined by (T1, . . . , TN ) with strategy space
([0, B1], . . . , [0, BN ]) is now a symmetric strictly-concave
game: each payoff Ti is concave and continuous in x and
the strategy spaces are nonempty and compact. Therefore a
unique Nash equilibrium exists.
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof. It suffices to prove that for any set of real numbers
a, b, A,B that
min(a+ b, A+B) ≥ min(a,A) + min(b, B). (65)
Lemma 2 follows from repeated application of (65).
To show (65) holds, we consider several cases. Let A be
the condition that {a ≤ A, b ≤ B} or {a ≥ A, b ≥ B}. Under
A,
min(a+ b, A+B) = min(a,A) + min(b, B). (66)
The complement of A consists of two disjoint cases: {a >
A, b < B} and {a < A, b > B} If {a > A, b < B},
min(a+b, A+B) = a+b > A+b = min(a,A)+min(b, B).
Similarly, if {a < A, b > B}
min(a+ b, A+B) > min(a,A) + min(b, B) (67)
under condition A¯. Combining (66) and (67) yields (65).
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof. We prove the four claims one by one.
Proof of Claim 1. By Assumption 5, pˆ is continuous,
differentiable, convex and increasing, then p is continuous,
differentiable, concave and decreasing. Since pˆ(y) → ∞,
p → −∞; and since pˆ(0) < 1, pˆ′(0) > 0, p(0) > 0 and
p′(0) < 0.
Proof of Claim 2. By definition of U ,
U
(∑
i
xi
)
=
∫ ∑
i
xi
0
p(z)dz
=
∫ ∑
i
xi
0
(1− pˆ(z)) dz
=
∑
i
xi − C
(∑
i
xi
)
. (68)
Also
∑
i
xi − E


(∑
i
xi −
∑
i
Xi
)+
= E

∑
i
xi −
(∑
i
xi −
∑
i
Xi
)+
=
{
E [
∑
i xi −
∑
i xi +
∑
iXi] if
∑
i xi >
∑
iXi
E [
∑
i xi] if
∑
i xi ≤
∑
iXi
= E
[
min
(∑
i
xi,
∑
i
Xi
)]
. (69)
Combining (68) and (69) yields (33). The derivation of (34)
follows in similar fashion as well.
Proof of Claim 3. We already established (33) holds. It
remains to prove that any solution x to (28) would satisfy∑
i xi < ymax, where ymax is the unique solution to p(y) = 0.
By our definition, p(y) = 1 − pˆ(y); therefore ymax is the
unique solution to pˆ(ymax) = 1. Now suppose pˆ(
∑
i xi) > 1,
then looking at (29),
d
dy
(
E
[
min(y,
∑
i
Xi)
])∣∣∣∣∣
y=
∑
i
xi
≤ 1 (70)
and
d
dy
C(y)|y=∑
i
xi = pˆ(
∑
i
xi) > 1. (71)
Thus x is not an optimal solution to (28), or equivalently, any
solution of (28) must satisfy
∑
i xi < ymax.
Proof of Claim 4. The proof of this claim proceeds very
similarly to the proof of Claim 3. Since (34) holds, we only
need to show that in both the game (T1, . . . , TN ) and the
game (pi1, . . . , piN ), no firm would bid xi > ymax in a Nash
equilibrium. Following the previous proof, it is straightforward
to show that if a firm chooses xi > ymax, then it would have
negative payoff regardless of the actions of the other firms.
Thus no firm would choose such an xi.
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